UK national minimum wage and labor market outcomes of young workers by Fidrmuc, Jan & Tena, JD
  1 
 
 
UK National Minimum Wage and Labor Market 
Outcomes of Young Workers* 
 
 
 
Jan Fidrmuc† and J.D. Tena‡ 
 
 
January 2018 
 
 
Abstract 
The UK national minimum wage (NMW) is age-specific with the most important threshold at 
the age of 22 (lowered to 21 from 2010 onwards) when workers become eligible for the adult 
rate. We estimate the impact of this threshold on employment by means of a regression 
discontinuity analysis. Because this threshold is known in advance, we investigate the 
presence of discontinuities in both the level and the slope of employment probabilities at 
different ages around the threshold. Our results indicate that turning 22 does not significantly 
change the employment probability. However, we find a significant change in the slope of the 
probability of being employed around one year before, suggesting a smooth deterioration of 
employment probability before turning 22 rather than a sudden change at a particular age. 
This finding is confirmed by a difference-in-difference analysis. However, no such effect can 
be found during the period preceding the introduction of the NMW. 
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1 Introduction 
The imposition of a mandatory minimum wage, whether at national, regional or industry 
level, is a common instrument of economic policy. Most OECD countries impose some form 
of a minimum wage (Dolton and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2012). Germany introduced a new 
national minimum wage in 2015, replacing the previous system of sector-wide collective 
bargaining, while the UK has recently introduced a new national living wage, which is set to 
rise at a rates substantially exceeding the recent increases in the national minimum wage. 
Many less developed countries have embraced the minimum wage, even Hong Kong, 
traditionally a bastion of the laissez-faire approach, introduced a minimum wage in 2010. 
Nevertheless, the minimum wage is a contentious measure, potentially raising workers’ 
earnings at the expense of worse employment prospects for those out of work. Indeed, 
standard neoclassical economic theory predicts that, under competitive markets, a wage floor 
should either have no effect on employment (if set at a sufficiently low rate) or should lower 
employment by preventing the least productive workers from finding work at market-clearing 
wages.1  
To date, the empirical evidence on employment effect of minimum wage rules is 
inconclusive. Neumark and Wascher (2004, 2007 and 2008) argue that the bulk of the 
evidence from the US as well as from other countries points to a negative employment effect 
of introducing (or increasing) the minimum wage. The range of estimated elasticities, 
however, is very broad: from significantly negative to significantly positive. This resonates 
with the findings of Dolado et al. (1996) who consider the employment effect of minimum 
wage rules in France, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, and also present estimates ranging 
from negative (especially for young workers) to positive. The meta-studies by Card and 
Krueger (1995b) and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009), in contrast, conclude that there is 
little evidence that the minimum wage lowers employment.2  
                                                 
1 Once we relax the assumption of competitive markets, however, the theoretical predictions can change 
dramatically. Assuming monopsony in the labor market, in particular, can result in a positive employment effect 
of the minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996): monopsony employer can push wages below the marginal product 
of labor, thereby maximizing profits while depressing employment. Imposing a wage floor, correspondingly, 
reduces the employer’s profits and increases employment. 
2 The unsettled state of the debate is typified by the recent polemic concerning the sign of employment effects of 
state minimum wages in the US. On the one hand, Dube, Lester and Reich (2010) and Allegretto, Dube and 
Reich (2011) argue that the previous research, summarized, inter alia, in Neumark and Wascher (2008), produces 
spurious results because it fails to account for state-level heterogeneity. They conclude that when the analysis 
controls for this heterogeneity, increases in state minimum wages have no disemployment effects. Neumark, 
Salas and Wascher (2014), in turn argue that the research of Dube et al. (2010) and Allegretto et al. (2011) is 
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In all of the aforementioned studies, workers who are most likely to be affected by the 
minimum wage, such as the young and the low-skilled, are found to experience especially 
large disemployment effects. The negative effect is mitigated when young workers are subject 
to a lower minimum-wage rate (see also Croucher and White, 2011; Dolton and Rosazza-
Bondibene, 2012; and Clemens, 2015). Abolishing the lower minimum-wage rates for young 
workers, likewise, tends to have a potentially large adverse effect on their employment and to 
lead to substitution of older workers for young workers (Hyslop and Stilman, 2007).  
The UK introduced the current national minimum wage (NMW) framework relatively 
late, in April 1999.3 Since then, the NMW has been subject to regular annual revisions, 
coming into effect every October from 2000 onwards. After its introduction, the effect of the 
NMW on employment has been analyzed by a number of studies. Stewart (2004) and Dickens 
and Draca (2005) consider the effect of the NMW’s introduction and the annual increases, 
respectively. Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene and Wadsworth (2009) utilize the fact that, unlike 
the NMW rates, average earnings vary considerably across the regions of the UK. They use 
the resulting variation in the ‘bite’ of the NMW at the regional level to assess its impact on 
employment. These studies find little evidence that the UK NMW has had an adverse effect 
on employment. The main (and probably only) exception is a recent study by Dickens, Riley 
and Wilkinson (2012) who present evidence that the introduction, and annual NMW 
increases, reduce the employment of part-time women, a segment of the labor market that is 
especially exposed to the minimum wage.  
In this paper, we focus on the effect of the lower rates for young workers on their 
employment when they are no longer eligible for the reduced rate. At its introduction in 1999, 
the NMW was formulated with two distinct rates: the adult rate for workers aged 22 and over, 
and the so-called development rate for those between 18 and 21 years of age.4 In 2004, an 
additional rate was introduced for those aged 16 and 17 who were not subject to the NMW 
until then. The ratio between the adult rate and the development rate has remained in the close 
neighborhood of 1.2 while the ratio between the development rate and the 16/17 rate has been 
                                                                                                                                                        
flawed and present results confirming the previous findings of disemployment effects of minimum wage 
increases.  
3 Until 1993, the Wages Councils had the power to set minimum wages for specific industries (not all industries 
had a Wages Council). No minimum wage was in place in the period between 1993 and 1999.  
4 From 2010, the upper age limit for the development rate has been lowered to 20. In 2016, an additional rate, the 
National Living Wage, applying to workers aged 25 and older, was introduced as well.  The data used in our 
analysis, however, pertain to the period before these changes.  
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approximately 1.35. This implies that young workers earning the NMW rate relevant for their 
age are subjected to a sharp wage increase upon turning 18 and then again at 22.5  
The previous literature has studied the impact of 'age-specific' NMW changes by means of 
a regression discontinuity design (henceforth RDD; see Imbens and Lee, 2008; van der 
Klaauw, 2008; and Lee and Lemieux, 2010). This intuition behind this is that the fact that 
workers on either side of the cutoff ages are eligible for substantially different NMW rates 
creates a quasi-experimental setting. Arguably, the characteristics of workers on either side of 
the cutoff age are very similar and therefore the main difference between them is the 
applicable NMW rate.6 The forcing variable, age, can be influenced neither by the workers 
nor by their employers (or anyone else, for that matter). Therefore, when comparing the 
workers who are just above the cutoff age and those just below this age, the difference 
between them is as good as random. The ‘treatment’ category then consists of workers older 
than the cutoff age while the rest constitute the ‘control’ group.  
However, the fact that aging is a deterministic rather than a random process7 suggests that 
employers could adjust their employment decisions well in advance of the workers reaching 
the age threshold. Moreover, this reaction can be gradual rather than abrupt at a specific age. 
Therefore, we investigate the presence of level and slope discontinuities at not only at 22 
years of age, but also one year earlier and later. We do this by following the recent literature, 
initiated by Card et al. (2012) and Nielsen et al. (2010), who propose the estimation of 
regression discontinuities affecting not only the level but also the slope of the outcome. Card 
et al. (2012) define this estimator for both fuzzy and sharp designs. 
In our analysis, we start by extending the earlier work by Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson 
(2014, henceforth DRW) who consider the effect of age-related increases in the NMW on the 
employment of low-skilled young workers in the UK and also use the regression discontinuity 
                                                 
5 Note that this increase only applies to those young workers who earn less than the adult minimum wage: 
nothing prevents employers from paying young workers the full adult rate. It is a difficult task to compute the 
proportion of workers who are affected by the adult minimum wage as only a small proportion of them reports 
their salaries. Based on the available information it is possible, at least, to compute the lower bound for the 
proportion of affected workers. This share is relatively low: across our data set, we find that 3.3% of workers 
within four months of turning 22 earn less than the adult rate. For comparison, 4.3% of workers who are similar 
distance from turning 21 earn less than the adult rate.  
6 In most of our analysis, we focus on comparing those subject to the 18-21 rate with workers earning the adult 
rate. The workers aged 16-17 differ from their older counterparts in several important ways: they are more likely 
to be in full-time education, their employability is lowered by restrictions such as not being allowed to sell 
alcoholic beverages, and their eligibility to benefits is more limited. Therefore, it is difficult to discern whether 
any employment effects that may occur upon turning 18 are due to becoming eligible to the higher NMW rate or 
whether they are entirely attributable to the age effect.  
7 See section 6.3.1 in Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
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design. They find, somewhat surprisingly, that low-skilled young workers are significantly 
more likely to be employed and significantly less likely to be either unemployed or out of the 
labor force as they turn 22. They attribute this to an increase in their labor supply: if the 18-21 
rate is below the reservation wage of some workers, such workers postpone their labor market 
entry until they can be certain of earning at least the adult NMW rate. However, the result 
disappears when they consider all workers rather than only the low-skilled ones.8 In most of 
our analysis, we consider all workers rather only low-skilled ones (although we also report 
separately regression results for low-skilled workers).9 
We also find no significant NMW impact when we look for discontinuities in the levels of 
employment probabilities at different ages. However, the results are different when looking at 
slope changes. In particular, we find a significant and negative impact in the slope of 
employment probabilities for males aged around 21. This suggests a gradual change in 
employability before reaching the threshold age. A plausible explanation is that this happens 
in anticipation of the workers reaching the age threshold: savvy cost-conscious employers 
may gradually start to avoid employing workers who approach the 22 years of age. 
Interestingly, this effect is not found when we use a pre-NMW sample, suggesting that it is 
indeed attributable to the presence of age-related NMW rates.  
Two recent papers, Kabatek (2015) and Kreiner, Reck and Skov (2017), consider the 
employment effects of age-related minimum-wage increases in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
respectively. In the Netherlands, the minimum wage changes in small increments with every 
year of age between the ages of 15 and 23. In Denmark, the minimum wage increases 
substantially when young workers turn 18. Both studies utilize the regression discontinuity 
design to find compelling evidence of negative age-related employment effects. Both studies 
find evidence of negative employment effects at/around the age discontinuity. However, in a 
context where economic agents adjust gradually rather than abruptly to the expected increase 
in wage, the minimum wage could have an effect on employment by altering the relationship 
between age and the employment probability rather than by having a one-off effect on the 
                                                 
8 Low skilled workers are defined as those whose qualifications are no higher than the GCSE exams (i.e. 
incomplete high school).  
9 Young workers are often subject to the minimum wage more or less independently of their skill level. DRW 
(Table 3) indeed report that the shares of low and high skilled workers paid the minimum wage are only 
marginally different from one another: 10% of high skilled vs 11% of low skilled workers earn less than the 
adult rate at the age of 21. Furthermore, we also extend the data by three quarters. This does not have a material 
effect, as we are able to replicate DRW’s results in our extended data set when we follow their methodology.  
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probability level. In our analysis, we employ a methodology that allows for the identification 
of a gradual adjustment of employment to age-specific NMW. 
The next Section presents the data used in our analysis and outlines our methodological 
strategy. The results of the discontinuity analysis are in Section 3. Section 4 presents some 
complementary results that explore the effect of age-specific NMW rates on labor-market 
outcomes further. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the results and 
suggesting some tentative avenues for further work.  
2 Data and Methodology 
We investigate the issue at hand using the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly 
nationally-representative survey of UK households. Each quarter, it reports on approximately 
60 thousand households and over 100 thousand individuals aged 16 and above. Each 
household is retained in the survey for five consecutive quarters, with one-fifth of households 
replaced in each wave. The survey contains detailed demographic and socio-economic 
information on the respondents, including their labor-market outcomes. As the NMW was 
introduced in April 1999 and the age threshold for the adult rate was lowered in October 
2010, we restrict our analysis to the period from the NMW introduction (i.e. starting with the 
April-June 1999 LFS) until the end of 2009 (so that the last quarterly LFS data set that we use 
is the October-December 2009 one).  
The LFS contains information on the exact date of birth of every respondent.10 We use 
this information to compute the age of each individual in months. Using the exact date the 
survey was carried out, we can determine the precise age of each respondents in months on 
the day of the survey was carried out (even when their birthday falls within the month in 
which they were interviewed). The discontinuity occurs at the workers’ 22nd birthday. As is 
common in the RDD literature, we redefine age so that it equals 0 in the month during which 
the individual reaches the cutoff age. That is, instead of age we use age–264, where age is 
expressed in months and 264 corresponds to 22 years. Although each LFS quarterly data set 
contains information on around 100 thousand individuals, only a relatively small fraction of 
them are close to the cutoff age. Therefore, we consider the widest possible observation 
window: workers whose ages are between 15 months below and 15 months above the cutoff 
                                                 
10 This information is not available in the publicly released LFS datasets. We are grateful to the Low Pay 
Commission and the Office for National Statistics for giving us access to the restricted release of the LFS.  
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age (recall that each worker appears in the LFS for five quarters, or 15 months). As a 
robustness checks, we replicate the analysis also for windows of 12 and 6 months.  
To provide an initial illustration of the pattern at hand, Figure 1 shows the proportion of 
employed and economically active people by age in months between the ages 18 and 23, with 
zero corresponding to the threshold age of 22) and gender. Clearly, there is no pronounced 
jump in the probability of being employed when reaching the age of 22. Rather, the graph 
plotting the employment probability seems to become steeper around the threshold age, 
especially for men, suggesting a change in slope (i.e. increasing probability of being 
employed with growing age), rather than a jump in that probability at the age of 22. There 
seems to be a similar increase in the slope of the graph plotting the activity rate, around two 
years before the 22
nd
 birthday. However, a more formal analysis is necessary to control for the 
individual characteristics and to test whether the level and/or slope effects are significantly 
different from zero. 
The regression discontinuity design is concerned with determining how the outcome of 
interest (labor-market status in this case) changes when individuals pass the relevant cutoff 
point (18 or 22 years of age). The RDD method, however, assumes that the forcing variable, 
age, is continuous. If this assumption is met, we can compare outcomes observed in an 
arbitrarily small neighborhood around the cutoff, with age approaching 0 (recall that the 
forcing variable, age is defined as age less the cutoff age). Age, however, is as a discrete 
rather than continuous variable. Lee and Card (2008) argue that this introduces uncertainty in 
the choice of functional forms in regression discontinuity designs. In this setting, it is no 
longer possible to estimate the impact of a covariate on the dependent variable by simply 
computing averages within arbitrarily small neighborhoods of the cutoff point, even with an 
infinite amount of data. Instead, it is necessary to choose a particular functional form for the 
model relating the outcomes of interest to the forcing variable. Of course, it has to be tested 
whether the specification error of the proposed functional form is not significantly different 
from a fully flexible functional form that allows for different impacts of the discrete values of 
the covariate for each different age.  
In a standard RDD specification, we would estimate 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑋𝑖 = 0], where 𝑌0 and 𝑌1 
are the pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes of interest, respectively, evaluated at the 
cutoff of the forcing variable, 𝑋𝑖 = 0. Note that 𝑌0 and 𝑌1 can be described by the following 
functions  
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𝐸[𝑌1|𝑋𝑖 = 0] =  𝜃 + 𝛼
∗ ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝜀1                 (1) 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝑋𝑖 = 0] =  𝜃 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀0                                  (2) 
where  includes the constant and any other covariates and d is a dummy taking value 0 
before and 1 after the cutoff. Note also that  
𝑌 = 𝑑 ∗ 𝑌1 + (1 − 𝑑) ∗ 𝑌0. 
The standard approach therefore is concerned with identifying the change in the mean 
outcome associated with a discrete change in the threshold variable, i.e. 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑋𝑖 = 0]. 
This can be estimated using the following functional form (see Lee and Card, 2008):  
𝐸[𝑌|𝑋𝑖 = 0] = 𝜃 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑑) + 𝛼
∗ ∗ 𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝜀                    (3)  
where Y is the variable of interest, Xi is the forcing variable less the cutoff, and 𝜀 = 𝑑 ∗ 𝜀1 +
(1 − 𝑑) ∗ 𝜀0. When evaluated at 𝑋𝑖 = 0, the discontinuity effect is captured by the coefficient 
estimate of 𝛽. 
Nevertheless, recent literature points out that the discontinuity effect may not be limited to 
the estimate of . In particular, the discontinuity may be associated with a slope change (kink) 
in addition to, or instead of, a jump in the intercept of the response function at the cutoff 
point. This possibility is discussed in detail in Dong (2014) who demonstrates the two 
possibilities and presents evidence of kink effects with respect to the take-up of early 
retirement in the US. Other studies offer analogous findings. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) find 
evidence of a slope change instead of a level effect at the cutoff with respect to the impact of 
remedial education programs on academic performance. Card et al. (2008) show that the 
change in the probability of retirement at 65 (the age of Medicare eligibility) is again more 
consistent with a change in the slope than with a level effect. Card et al. (2009) label this 
approach ‘Regression Kink Design (RKD)’. Theorem 2 in Dong (2014) generalizes these 
arguments by showing that the treatment effect is equal to the ratio between the combination 
of the RD and RKD in the numerator and a similar combination of their associated 
probabilities of treatment in the denominator. If there is no jump (level effect) the treatment 
effect reduces to the RDK. As explained by Dong (2014), the sharp design RD model is just a 
special case in which everybody is a complier. 
We therefore consider both types of discontinuity effects: the level (jump) effect and the 
slope (kink) effect. More specifically, the outcome of interest is the probability of being 
employed, unemployed or inactive at the cutoff age. We estimate the following equation:  
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𝐸[𝑦|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑] = F(𝜃 + 𝛼0 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑑) + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 ∗ (1 − 𝑑) + 𝛼0
∗ ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑑              
+ 𝛼1
∗ ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
2 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑑)  = F(u)                  (4) 
where yi is equal to one if the individual is employed (unemployed, inactive), F is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, agei is the age in months less the cutoff, d is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the individual’s is at the cutoff age or older and  again 
includes any remaining terms such as the constant and the covariates (qualifications, ethnic 
origin, apprenticeship, region of usual residence and being a full time student). We allow for 
the effect of age to be different before and after the young workers attain the threshold age. 
This is standard in the regression discontinuity approach, reflecting the fact that the effect of 
the forcing variables may change after the cutoff. If we did not allow different slope 
coefficients, the pre-cutoff and post-cutoff relationships would be estimated using information 
contained in the both parts of the sample: those pertaining to the pre-treatment sub-sample 
would be estimated using information affected by the treatment and vice versa (see Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010). Age takes the form of a quadratic polynomial which we test against an 
alternatives fully-flexible specification with each age in months captured by a separate 
dummy. 
In expression (4), the jump in the probability of a particular employment status at the 
cutoff point (level effect) is measured as the marginal effect associated with the discontinuity 
dummy, 𝑑. We also estimate the change in the slope of F with respect to age at the 
discontinuity point. Note that because F is a non-linear (probit) function in which slope 
parameters are is associated with different interaction terms, neither the differences in the 
coefficients of the age polynomial before and after the cutoff (𝛼0 and 𝛼1 vs 𝛼0
∗ and 𝛼1
∗) nor the 
marginal effects of changing just the interaction terms have any relevant interpretation (see 
Norton et al., 2004). Instead, following Norton et al. (2004), the interaction effect between 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 and 𝑑  corresponds to the discrete double difference, which for expression (4) takes the 
following form: 
∆
∆𝐹(. )
∆𝑎𝑔𝑒
∆𝑑
= 𝐹(𝜃 + 𝛽) − 𝐹(𝜃 − 𝛼0
∗ + 𝛼1
∗ + 𝛽) − 𝐹(𝜃) + 𝐹(𝜃 − 𝛼0 + 𝛼1)      (5) 
Note that expression above is nowadays implemented in the Stata margins command to 
compute marginal effects. We evaluate this expression by double-differencing the functional 
form at 𝑎𝑔𝑒 equal 0 and -1 and at 𝑑 equal 1 and 0. For robustness we also treat 𝑎𝑔𝑒 as a 
continuous variable and compute the slope change as the difference of the derivative of the 
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response function at 𝑑 equal 1 and 0 but it does not change our findings (these results are 
available under request).  
3 NMW and Young Workers: Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
To assess the impact of age-related MNW increases, we start by looking at individuals whose 
age is on either side of 22 years (264 months). Table 1 reports regression results for the 
probability of being employed. We present estimates for males and females separately as well 
as for both genders together, with and without additional covariates. We consider all 
individuals regardless of their skill level (in contrast to DRW, 2014), since skilled and 
unskilled young workers have very similar propensities to be paid the NMW. Specification 
(4) is tested against a fully flexible functional form. For men, we cannot reject that both 
specifications are significantly different at the conventional levels while for women the 
quadratic specification is rejected, we also consider the cubic specification with no material 
change in the results. The row denoted discontinuity reports the slope (kink) marginal effect at 
the discontinuity, as given by equation (5). Dummy, in contrast, stands for the marginal effect 
of 𝑑 (jump).  
Neither the slope effect, nor the discontinuity dummy on its own, is significant when workers 
turn 22. This is in line with the previous findings of DRW who also report an insignificant 
result when they include all individuals rather than only the low-skilled ones. For the sake of 
comparability, we replicate DRW’s analysis of low-skilled workers: these are those who left 
school at the age of 16 after completing their GCSEs as well as those who report having no 
qualifications. DRW find a significant positive effect of turning 22 for low-skilled workers, 
suggesting that becoming eligible for the adult NMW rate increases rather than reduces their 
employment. These results are in Table 2. They are broadly in line with DRW’s but appear 
somewhat weaker.11 In particular, while the discontinuity dummy is always positive, it is 
never significant for females, and it is significant only in the 5-10% range for males and for 
both genders together. More importantly, the combined level and slope effect is never even 
close to being significant. We are therefore unable to confirm the finding of a positive 
employment effect of becoming eligible for the adult NMW rate at the age of 22.  
                                                 
11 Note that while we attempt to replicate DRW’s results, there are some potentially important differences 
between their analysis and ours. In particular, we consider a 15-month window before/after the individual’s 22nd 
birthday while they only consider 12 months, we compute the age in months slightly differently as discussed 
above, our data include three additional quarters in 2009, and, finally, although we sought to include the same 
covariates as them, it is possible that some of the covariates may be coded or formatted differently.  
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Next, Tables 3 and 4 present the regression results for unemployment and inactivity, 
respectively, considering again all workers regardless of their skill level. As before, the slope 
effect is never significant. Note however that the dummy alone is significant and negative in 
the regressions for unemployment with all individuals, which mirrors the similar finding of 
DRW. As we argue above, accepting this as the effect of the discontinuity would be wrong as 
it ignores the fact that the effect of age may also change upon surpassing the age threshold.  
In summary, we find no evidence that the approximately 20% increase in the rate of the 
NMW at the age of 22 has any effect – whether positive or negative – on young workers’ 
employment, unemployment or inactivity. This conclusion does not depend on whether we 
consider all young workers or only the unskilled ones.  
To probe the NMW effect on young workers further, we undertake a number of 
extensions. In Table 5, we consider the effect of turning 22 on employment conditional on 
labor-market status (employed, unemployed or inactive) in the previous quarter. It may well 
be that the increase in the NMW rate that applies to workers from their 22
nd
 birthday affects 
employed and unemployed workers differently. For instance, some of those who were 
employed at 21 may lose their jobs, while others enter the labor market or intensify their job 
search because of the higher NMW rate. If this is the case, the result presented in Table 1 
could be insignificant because these two kinds of effects cancel out. The analysis is again 
presented separately for males and females (to save on space, we omit the results for both 
genders together). In the first two columns of Table 5, we present the estimates for the 
probability of remaining employed, conditional on being previously employed. The estimated 
effect of turning 22 is negative, especially for men, but it is not even close to being significant 
at conventionally accepted levels. Hence, young workers who were employed at the age of 21 
are no more or less likely to be employed after their 22
nd
 birthday. The next two columns 
present the estimates of the probability of being employed at 22, conditional on being 
unemployed before. The last two columns, in turn, present the corresponding estimates for 
those who were inactive before the quarter in which they turned 22. Again, none of these 
coefficients are significant, suggesting that controlling for the labor market status of young 
workers just before they turn 22 makes little difference to our findings.  
Next, in Table 6, we consider only those young workers who earn less than the adult rate 
when they are 21. Such workers are bound to be affected by the age-mandated increase in the 
NMW upon turning 22. The previous analysis, in contrast, included all workers, regardless of 
whether their wages had to be raised or not. As before, we are unable to find any significant 
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discontinuity effect (level or slope) on the employment probability. One drawback of this 
analysis, however, is the rather small sample size, which may be responsible for the lack of 
significant results.  
Finally, we also test the possibility that the employment effect occurs at an age different 
from 22. As discussed before, since the timing of becoming eligible for the adult rate is 
deterministic, employers can reflect it in their decisions at any time either before or after the 
workers reach the threshold age. Therefore, we repeat the discontinuity analysis for workers 
turning 21 and 23 years of age (Table 7). The result at the age of 21 is striking: the slope 
effect suggests that male workers are significantly less likely to remain employed after turning 
21. In contrast, reaching their 23
rd
 birthday has no significant impact on employment of males 
or females.  
The fall in the slope of the employment probability at 21 for men may be driven by an 
anticipation effect: employers are aware of the age-related NMW increase that young workers 
are entitled to after their 22
nd
 birthday and gradually start to dismiss them well in advance of 
the relevant date and/or they refrain from hiring workers aged around 21. Note that the effect 
on employment occurs because the effect of age on the employment probability changes when 
workers are around 21 years old (slope/kink effect), rather than because of a level change in 
the employment probability.12 This may be also due to the low share of workers earning less 
than the adult rate of the minimum wage13: given the relatively small number of young 
workers affected, the impact occurs gradually through a change in the relationship between 
employment probability and age rather than taking the shape of a discrete jump in that 
probability.  
Finally, we also consider the NMW threshold at 18 years of age. Recall that those turning 
18 become eligible for the 18-21 rate which historically has been some 35% above the 16-17 
rate. As before, we consider all workers, irrespective of skills (although the differences in skill 
levels at this age are not particularly large). Table 8 reports the results. Turning 18 is 
associated with a significantly negative slope effect for both genders (as is already apparent in 
Figures 2-4): becoming eligible for the higher NMW rate is associated with lower 
                                                 
12 We replicate the discontinuity analysis at 21
st
, 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 birthday with 6 and 12 month estimation windows 
instead of 15 months (see the Appendix). The results obtained with the 6 month window are never significant. 
This may be due to the lower number of observations when using the shorter estimation window. Moreover, the 
discontinuity effect may take time to become sufficiently pronounced. The regressions with the 12 month 
window generally paint the same picture as those discussed above. In particular, the discontinuity effect is 
negative both at the age of 21 and 22 for males: the former is significant at 10% while the latter is not significant. 
13 Recall that only 3.3% of workers within four months of turning 22, and 4.3% of those approaching their 21
st
 
birthday, earn less than the adult rate.  
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employment probability. Note that again this negative effect is observed only when we 
consider the slope effect: the dummy itself is not significantly different from zero (except for 
females). The insignificant coefficient for the discontinuity dummy is in line with the finding 
of DRW. The differences in the conclusions reached when considering the discontinuity 
dummy only and when looking also at the changed effects of the age polynomial again 
underscores the importance of assessing the full effect of the discontinuity.  
As we argued before, turning 18 is associated with a host of other important changes 
besides becoming eligible for a higher NMW rate. For example, UK law requires anyone 
selling or serving alcohol to be 18 or older, which makes those under 18 ineligible to work in 
bars, restaurants and many shops. This makes the negative effect that we found all the more 
remarkable. An alternative explanation would link the effect that we observe to the end of 
full-time secondary education. In the UK, education was compulsory until the age of 16 
during the time covered by our analysis but many students would stay enrolled for another 
two years to complete their secondary education. Those who do so without enrolling in higher 
education upon graduating then generally enter the job market when aged 18. This may 
explain why the employment probability first dips around the 18
th
 birthday and then rises, 
both for males and females.  
Finally, we return to the possibility that the age-related effects we observe are caused by 
factor other than the NMW: such as features of the UK education system or welfare state. We 
therefore re-estimate the discontinuity effects for the period before the NMW introduction. 
Throughout much of its post-WWII history, the UK had a number of sector-specific wage 
floors maintained by the so-called Wages Councils. The Wages Councils were abolished in 
1993 while the NMW was introduced only in 1999. We therefore replicate our discontinuity 
analysis for 1994-98, a period during which no minimum wage or similar rules were in effect. 
We are not aware of any significant changes to the UK education or welfare systems that 
would coincide with the introduction of the NMW in 1999. Therefore, if the effect of age is 
different during the 1994-98 period, it is highly probable that this difference can be attributed 
to the effect of age-specific NMW rates.  
Table 9 presents the results for young workers turning 18, 21, 22 and 23 during 1994-98. 
None of the age-discontinuity effects is even remotely significant (and the discontinuity 
dummy is not significant either). These results increase our confidence that the observed age-
related effects discussed above are indeed attributable to the MNW rules.  
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4 Robustness  
One implication of the results presented so far is that the regression discontinuity design 
should not be used when the forcing variable is deterministic rather than random. In other 
words, the RDD methodology is applicable when the agents (workers and employers in this 
setting) have no incentive to act before the discontinuity actually occurs. That is not the case 
here: employers who do not wish employ workers older than 22 can dismiss workers who are 
close but below this age, and/or hire only workers substantially younger than 22. This may 
explain why in our analysis the negative employment effect occurs well before the workers 
actually turn 22.  
Therefore, we employ an alternative method to verify our results. A standard difference-
in-difference analysis is not possible in this case because all workers are treated: there is no 
control group composed of workers who reach the cutoff age but do not become eligible to 
the higher NMW rate. Therefore, we estimate the following modified difference-in-difference 
model:  
𝑝(𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 = 0) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 > 𝛿) + 𝛾𝑋𝑡)  (1) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the individual is employed and zero if 
unemployed; 𝑝 is the probability of transition from being unemployed to employed, 𝑋𝑡 is the 
usual vector of covariates that includes also age and age squared, and 𝐼(. ) is an indicator 
function that takes the value of 1 when the age is higher or equal to a given threshold  and 
zero otherwise. We define analogous probabilities for the other transitions between the 
various labor-market states. The sample contains all individuals aged between 18 and 40. The 
marginal effect associated with 𝐼(. ) reflects the structural change in the probability of 
changing employment status in the neighborhood of , the age where there new national 
minimum wage applies. Therefore, the difference-in-difference aspect is entailed in the fact 
that we compare the change in the probability of being employed between two consecutive 
quarters for workers not attaining the threshold age (control group) with the corresponding 
change in the employment probability for those workers attaining the threshold age (treatment 
group). Hence, while it is not a standard difference-in-difference approach, it is very similar in 
spirit. Consistently with our previous analysis, we also explore the possibility that the effect 
associated with reaching this age applies before workers turn 22.  
The results are presented in Tables 10 to 13. First, in Tables 10-11, we consider the 
probability of staying employed and the transition from unemployment to employment, 
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respectively. However, this leaves out the flows to and from inactivity. Therefore, in Tables 
12-13, we consider the probability of staying active and the transition from inactivity to being 
active, respectively. We estimate the marginal effect associated with 𝐼(. ) for the age of 22 and 
for ages up to one year below and above this age, in quarterly increments.  
The findings from this analysis are generally in line with those presented in the preceding 
section. In Table 10, males aged 21-22 have a negative probability of staying employed: this 
effect is not significant at conventional levels but is close to being significant at 10% at the 
ages of 21 and 21 and one-quarter. We see similar negative effect on the probability of 
becoming employed if previously unemployed for males and females aged 21-22; these are 
significant for females aged 21 to 21 and half. In contrast, attaining ages between 22 and a 
quarter and 23 has either insignificant or significantly positive effect on the probability of 
staying employed and on the transition from unemployment to employment.  
These effects are even stronger when we consider transitions to/from inactivity. In Table 
12, males aged 21-22 have a negative probability of staying active. The effects of turning 21 
and a quarter, 21 and half and 22 are significantly negative, the remaining two ages are close 
to being significant. Both males and females aged 21-22 face a negative probability of 
transition from inactivity to being active (Table 13), with these effects being significant for 
males aged between 21 and 21 and half (and close to being significant at the remaining two 
ages) and for all ages for females. Again, being older than 22 has either an insignificant or 
significantly positive effect on the transition probabilities we consider.  
As a further robustness check, we replicate the above analysis with only individuals aged 
between 18 and 26, so as to only consider workers who are relatively close to the threshold 
age. The results, while weaker because of the lower number of observations, are generally 
consistent with those reported above. For the sake of brevity, we are not reporting these 
results here but they are available upon request.  
In summary, these results obtained with standard regression analysis confirm our findings 
based on the RDD analysis: young workers aged between 21 and 22 are in an unfavorable 
labor market position, relative to workers older than 22. A plausible explanation is that the 
age-specific NMW rates affect the employment of young workers: being close to the age 
threshold makes workers between 21 and 22 years of age less employable. 
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5 Conclusions 
The received wisdom in the UK concerning the national minimum wage is that it has had little 
adverse impact on employment. In this paper, we revisit this result. We consider young 
workers and investigate whether their labor-market outcomes are affected by the age-specific 
minimum-wage rates. Specifically, during the period covered by our analysis, the NMW 
featured different rates for those who aged 16-17, 18-21 and more than 22 years old. Using 
the regression-discontinuity approach, we find that although the effect of turning 22 is 
negative, it is not statistically significant. In contrast, we do find evidence of a negative 
employment effect for males aged 21. While in the period we have studied the NMW does not 
change at this age, we believe this result may be driven by the anticipation of the minimum 
wage increase at 22. Importantly, we only observe a change in the relationship between age 
and employment probability (i.e. slope effect), not a discrete jump in the underlying 
probability of being employed (level effect). The fact that most regression-discontinuity 
analysis only consider level effects can be the reason why previous studies failed to observe 
an effect at this age.  
Finding a negative effect for workers aged 21 reflects the specific nature of the case that we 
consider. While the regression discontinuity approach is usually used to study outcomes that 
are assigned (approximately) randomly, there is nothing random about the outcome in this 
case: young workers turn 22 in an entirely deterministic fashion. The employment effect 
associated with the discontinuity (higher NMW rate applying to those aged 22 and above) 
therefore can occur anywhere in the neighborhood of the cutoff age, whether before or after. 
We find a negative effect approximately one year before the cut-off age: this is consistent 
with employers avoiding hiring or dismissing workers who are 21 and older. This finding is 
similar to that of Kabátek (2015) who finds that Dutch young workers face lower employment 
probability around their birthday, in a setting where the minimum wage rate changes with 
every year of age. In the UK context, where each NMW rate applies to broader age bands, the 
overlap of the negative employment effects with the workers’ birthdays is less close.  
Our results are further strengthened by the fact that no such negative effects occur during 
the pre-NMW period, 1994-98. Furthermore, we obtain similar results with a difference-in-
difference analysis of transition probabilities between the various labor-market states: again, 
being aged between 21 and 22 is associated with generally unfavorable labor-market 
outcomes: lower probability of staying employed (active) and/or lower probability of moving 
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from unemployment (inactivity) to employment (becoming active) while no unfavorable 
outcomes are observed for workers aged above 22 and up to 23.  
The UK NMW rules concerning young workers were modified in October 2010 in that the 
threshold age for the adult rate has been lowered from 22 to 21. From April 2016, a new and 
higher National Living Wage applies to all workers above the age of 25. Our findings (and 
results reported elsewhere in the literature) suggest that these changes may negatively affect 
the young workers approaching the respective cutoff ages.  
Finally, our work has two important methodological implications. First, it underscores that 
when applying the regression discontinuity approach to deterministic processes, the effect 
need not coincide with the discontinuity. Instead, it can occur either before or after the 
discontinuity is reached. Second, it is important to correctly account for the effect of the 
regression discontinuity in cases when it can entail both level and slope effects. In particular, 
the negative employment effects that we find at 18 and 21 are only apparent when we 
consider the slope effect in addition to the more conventional level effect. 
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Table 1 Discontinuity effect on employment: All young workers.  
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00122  
(.00244)  
.00227 
(.00236)  
-.00228 
(.00331)  
.00055 
(.00328)  
.00368 
(.00353)  
.00356 
(.00336)  
Dum
(2)
  .00482  
(.00800)  
.00480 
(.00772)  
.00567 
(.01097)  
.00502  
(.0107)  
.00589 
(.01154)  
.00348  
(.01103)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
26345.97  638.70  15412.56  480.74  12942.46  218.54  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1524  0.0037  0.1918  0.0060  0.1411  0.0024  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
27.11  29.11  27.55  . 34.08  44.13  53.25  
Pr>Chi  0.3503  0.2539  0.3292  0.1063  0.0105  0.0008  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the threshold 
dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Coefficients reported are 
marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted 
as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 2 Discontinuity effect on employment: Low skilled young workers.  
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00211 
(.00418) 
.00224 
(.00415) 
.00214 
(.00555) 
.00270 
(.00561) 
.00061 
(.00595) 
.00193 
(.00589) 
Dum
(2)
  .02940 
(.01402)* 
.02241 
(01386) 
.03380 
(.01852) 
.02807 
(.01859) 
.02486 
(.02002) 
.01822 
(.01971) 
No. observations  43809 43809 20457 20457 23352 23352 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
2686.26  3.24 1621.56 42.32 1174.80 14.47 
Pr>Chi 0.0000 0.6633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129 
R2  0.0478 0.0001 0.0705 0.0018 0.0370 0.0005 
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
45.31 43.99 24.89 30.52 61.38 58.20 
Pr>Chi  0.0077 0.0109 0.4683 0.2054 0.0001 0.0002 
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the threshold 
dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Coefficients reported are 
marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted 
as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 3 Discontinuity effect on unemployment.  
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00118 
(.00126)  
.00107 
(.00135)  
.00190 
(.00195)  
.00175 
(.00212)  
.00037 
(.00160)  
.000200 
(.00170)  
Dum
(2)
  -.008830 
(.00425)* 
-.00919 
(.00452)* 
-.01013 
(.00659)  
-.01104  
(.0071)  
-.00844 
(.00535)  
-.00819 
(.00565)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
3489.80  61.34  2721.18  44.54  1170.22  15.95  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0070  
R2  0.0446  0.0008  0.0621  0.0010  0.0347  0.0005  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
19.40  15.69  26.00  23.85  23.16  20.95  
Pr>Chi  0.7776  0.9237  0.4078  0.5278  0.5682  0.6955  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the threshold 
dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Coefficients reported are 
marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted 
as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 4 Discontinuity effect on inactivity.  
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00151 
(.00160)  
-.00347 
(.00220)  
.00038 
(.00249)  
-.00252  
(.00291)  
-.00451 
(.00334)  
-.00389  
(.00323)  
Dum
(2)
  .00539 
(.00698)  
.00444 
(.00705)  
.00695 
(.00819)  
.00615  
(.00919)  
.00287  
(.01072)  
.00474 
(.01047)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
29973.84  541.74  20380.64  446.08  13752.84  189.13  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1971  0.0036  0.3135  0.0069  0.1614  0.0022  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
21.83  25.18  27.69  24.00  30.59  46.73  
Pr>Chi  0.6455  0.4521  0.3225  0.5194  0.2030  0.0053  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the threshold 
dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Coefficients reported are 
marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted 
as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 5 Probability of employment conditional on being employed in previous quarter.  
 Males Females Males Females Males Females 
 Emp from 
emp 
(without 
covariates) 
Emp from 
emp 
(without 
covariates) 
Emp from 
unemp 
(without 
covariates) 
Emp from 
unemp 
(without 
covariates) 
 Emp from 
inact 
(without 
covariates) 
Emp from 
inact 
(without 
covariates) 
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00184 
(.00158)  
-.00004 
(.00181)  
-.01189 
(.00936)  
.01636 
(.01102)  
.00030 
(.00663)  
-.00500 
(.00518)  
Dum
(2)
  .00483 
(.00822)  
.00114 
(.00843)  
-.01864 
(.04345)  
.01636 
(.05514)  
.03364  
(.02418)  
.02886 
(.01552)  
No. observations  27921  26030  3956  2671  6795  11815  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
42.09  30.76  7.89  11.21  7.48  10.13  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.1625  0.0473  0.1876  0.0716  
R2  0.0037  0.0029  0.0017  0.0033  0.0016  0.0014  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the threshold 
dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Coefficients reported are 
marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted 
as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 6 Probability of employment for workers earning less than adult rate.  
 Males  Females  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.0271372 
(.0203325) 
-.0196407 
(.0188205) 
Dum
(2)
  -.0142615      
(.07441) 
-.0391771      
(.04997) 
No. observations  644  1097  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
8.22 6.70 
Pr>Chi  0.1444  0.2438 
R2  0.0161  0.0088  
Notes: None of the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account 
the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey. The 
regressions do not contain additional control variables due to low number of observations.  
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Table 7 Discontinuity effect at 21 and 23.  
 21 years  23 years  
 Males  Females  Males  Females  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00994  
(.00326)**  
-.001039  
(.00349) 
.00435 
(.00318)  
-.00179 
(.00336)  
Dum
(2)
  -.00764 
(.01150)  
-.00186 
(.01184)  
.01043 
(.01023)  
-.01325 
(.01138)  
No. observations  68324  70647  65206  70622  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
17001.14  12155.02  13443.49  14310.83  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1947  0.11285  0.1879  0.1602  
Notes: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the 
impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.   
  28 
Table 8 Discontinuity effect at 18.  
 Males  Females  All  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -0.01018 
(0.00361)** 
-.01009 
(.00362)** 
-0.00984 
(0.00255)** 
Dum
(2)
  -0.00238 
(0.01253) 
-.0253495 
(.01263)* 
-.012706 
(0.00888) 
No. observations  67641 65023 132664 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
16587.27 9896.45 25665.83 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
R2  0.1788 0.1110 0.1410 
Notes: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the 
impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 9 Discontinuity Effect on Employment: All Young Workers, Pre-NMW Period (1994-98).  
 18 years 21 years   22 years   23 years  
 All  Males Females All Males  Females  All Males  Females  All Males Females 
Discontinuity
(1)
  0.003 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.0003 
(0.005) 
-0.00072 
(0.0038) 
-0.004 
(0.0181) 
 
-0.0056 
(0.0183) 
0.0004 
(0.00368)  
0.00528 
(0.017)  
0.0175 
(0.018) 
0.0018 
(0.0034) 
0.0144 
(0.0156)  
0.0072 
(0.005) 
Dum
(2)
  -0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.00582 
(0.00842) 
0.00804      
(0.0055) 
 
-0.0097 
(0.0053) 
0.006      
(0.0122) 
-0.0008  
(0.005)  
0.00205 
(0.0053) 
0.0056 
(0.011) 
-0.0047 
(0.0045)  
-0.0036 
(0.0166) 
No. observations  60,708 30428 30280 60,422 29872  30,550 62,871 30,606 32,265 66,377 31,839  34,538 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
12724.
21 
8069.3
4 
5136.23 13128.36 7964.52 5768.08 13647.50 7556.75 6809.31 13466.25 6873.88  7512.05 
Pr>Chi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
R2  0.1555 0.1993 0.1246 0.1634 0.2052  0.1396 0.1685  0.1994 0.1592 0.1656 0.1877  0.1698 
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
27.12 25.42 20.72 26.78 26.25 22.92 36.29  39.64 22.88 35.07 37.19  18.56 
Pr>Chi  0.35 0.43 0.71 0.37 0.39 0.58 0.07  0.03 0.58 0.09 0.06 0.81 
Notes: Marginal effects at mean values and standard deviations between brackets. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and 
the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force 
Survey.  
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Table 10 Probability of employment if previously employed 
     Age     
Both genders 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 13470.60 13470.52 13470.52 13468.17 13467.87 13472.21 13473.56 13484.51 13483.61 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0761 0.0761 0.0761 0.0761 0.0761 0.0762 0.0762 0.0762 0.0762 
Number of obs 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 684,033 
Age dummy .0016209 
(.00095) 
.001581 
(.00094) 
.001581 
(.00094) 
.0002122 
(.00088) 
.0004836 
(.00087) 
.0020363 
(.00097)* 
.0023356 
(.00098)* 
.004018 
(.00103)** 
.0038974 
(.00102)** 
Males 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 8263.71 8263.76 8264.18 8266.26 8265.38 8263.70 8263.83 8266.98 8267.26 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 0.1020 
Number of obs 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 351,448 
Age dummy -.0000747 
(.00105) 
-.000252 
(.00103) 
-.0006966 
(.001) 
-.0015604 
(.00094) 
-.0012496 
(.00094) 
-.0000396 
(.00106) 
.0003798 
(.00109) 
.0020187 
(.00115) 
.0021046 
(.00116) 
Females 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 5792.36 5792.96 5790.09 5790.68 5791.39 5794.72 5794.96 5800.54 5799.33 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0606 0.0606 0.0606 0.0606 0.0607 0.0607 0.0607 0.0607 0.0607 
Number of obs 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 332,585 
Age dummy .0030462 
(.00161) 
.0032544 
(.00161)* 
.0018685 
(.00154) 
.0021727 
(.00152) 
.0024771 
(.00151) 
.0039468 
(.00166)* 
.0040406 
(.00167)* 
.0056201 
(.00172)** 
.0052968 
(.0017)** 
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 11 Probability of employment if previously unemployed 
     Age     
Both genders 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 11369.60 11370.79 11371.38 11374.41 11377.23 11369.27 11371.05 11372.83 11374.85 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 0.0745 
Number of obs 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 205,763 
Age dummy -.0020543 
(.00332) 
-.0041112 
(.00331) 
-.0047481 
(.00326) 
-.007242 
(.00323)* 
-.0088428 
(.00318)** 
.000814 
(.00333) 
.0045338 
(.00332) 
.0063867 
(.00332) 
.0079904 
(.00332)* 
Males 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 4803.38 4803.76 4804.06 4805.60 4805.40 4803.46 4806.13 4807.74 4811.31 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0806 0.0807 0.0807 
Number of obs 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 66,314 
Age dummy -.0036223 
(.00643) 
-.0052805 
(.00636) 
-.0061938 
(.00624) 
-.0096835 
(.00614) 
-.0090775 
(.006) 
.0040812 
(.00645) 
.0114005 
(.00647) 
.0141526 
(.0065)* 
.0188503 
(.00651)** 
Females 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 6888.01 6890.43 6891.96 6891.96 6901.52 6887.54 6886.67 6886.55 6886.60 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.0754 0.0754 0.0754 0.0754 0.0755 0.0754 0.0753 0.0753 0.0753 
Number of obs 139,449 139,449 139,449 139,449 139,449 139449 139,449 139,449 139,449 
Age dummy -.0046483 
(.00387) 
-.007522 
(.00389) 
-.0087743 
(.00386)* 
-.011327 
(.00386)** 
-.0143219 
(.00387)** 
-.0038875 
(.0039) 
-.0014756 
(.00388) 
.0005819 
(.00385) 
.0010565 
(.00386) 
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 12 Probability of being active if previously active 
     Age     
Both genders 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 16699.80 16699.88 16699.64 16699.58 16699.68 16700.34 16701.62 16703.27 16704.95 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 0.1017 
Number of obs 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 729,603 
Age dummy .0003973 
(.00079) 
.0004493 
(.00078) 
-.0002401 
(.00075) 
-.0001433 
(.00074) 
.0002721 
(.00074) 
.0007158 
(.00081) 
.0011729 
(.00083) 
.0015888 
(.00084) 
.0019234 
(.00085)* 
Males 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 10633.70 10631.93 10633.70 10633.47 10632.12 10631.84 10629.32 10629.28 10630.67 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.1728 0.1727 0.1728 0.1728 0.1727 0.1727 0.1727 0.1727 0.1727 
Number of obs 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 376,571 
Age dummy -.0014179 
(.00064)* 
-.0010987 
(.00064) 
-.0013673 
(.00061)* 
-.0013047 
(.0006)* 
-.0010599 
(.0006) 
-.0011169 
(.00066) 
-.0002173 
(.00072) 
.0001574 
(.00074) 
.0009088 
(.00078) 
Females 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 7264.46 7263.42 7261.77 7261.79 7262.20 7265.31 7264.25 7265.38 7264.80 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0723 0.0723 0.0722 0.0722 0.0722 0.0723 0.0723 0.0723 0.0723 
Number of obs 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 
Age dummy .0025263 
(.00153) 
.0019857 
(.0015) 
.0006259 
(.00143) 
.0006483 
(.00141) 
.0010871 
(.0014) 
.0029148 
(.00156) 
.002468 
(.00155) 
.0029646 
(.00157) 
.0027163 
(.00156) 
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 13 Probability of being active if previously inactive 
     Age     
Both genders 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 8471.42 8480.07 8488.36 8502.44 8518.01 8464.80 8463.44 8465.82 8468.76 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0688 0.0689 0.0689 0.0691 0.0692 0.0688 0.0688 0.0688 0.0688 
Number of obs 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 160,193 
Age dummy -.0114645 
(.00414)** 
-.0164531 
(.00416)** 
-.0198498 
(.00413)** 
-.0245086 
(.00411)** 
-.0285808 
(.00409)** 
-.0047801 
(.00411) 
.0005206 
(.00408) 
.0063091 
(.00404) 
.0094293 
(.00402)* 
Males 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 3814.32 3815.49 3818.74 3824.39 3823.83 3813.48 3813.49 3815.90 3817.42 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0993 0.0993 0.0994 0.0996 0.0996 0.0993 0.0993 0.0994 0.0994 
Number of obs 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 41,191 
Age dummy -.0095377 
(.00852) 
-.0129862 
(.0084) 
-.019417 
(.00827)* 
-.0267907 
(.00814)** 
-.0253449 
(.0079)** 
.0055336 
(.00854) 
.0057296 
(.00868) 
.0147712 
(.00871) 
.0184615 
(.00878)* 
Females 22 21.75 21.5 21.25 21 22.25 22.5 22.75 23 
LR Chi2 (59) 4994.53 5002.71 5006.75 5015.52 5031.50 4992.16 4987.86 4987.81 4988.55 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0597 0.0598 0.0598 0.0600 0.0601 0.0597 0.0596 0.0596 0.0596 
Number of obs 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 119,002 
Age dummy -.012263 
(.0048)* 
-.0181837 
(.00489)** 
-.0202577 
(.00487)** 
-.0243045 
(.00489)** 
-.0304249 
(.00495)** 
-.0100238 
(.00482)* 
-.0023293 
(.00468) 
.0020671 
(.00462) 
.0044669 
(.00458) 
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
  
 
 
34 
Figure 1a Proportion of employed people by age (in month, with 22 years indicated as 0) 
 
 
Figure 1b Proportion of economically active people by age (in month, with 22 years 
indicated as 0) 
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Appendix (not for publication) 
Regression-discontinuity analysis: Alternative time windows 
 
All workers. Discontinuity effect at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00092 
(.00969) 
-.00461 
(.00350) 
.00116 
(.00965) 
-.00045 
(.00350) 
-.00961 
(.00891) 
.00096 
(.00334) 
Dum
(2)
  .01341 
(.01425) 
-.00430 
(.00945) 
.01026 
(.01395) 
.01483 
(.02617) 
-.01239 
(.01323) 
-.00188 
(.00876)       
No. observations  57797 109453 57513 108102 56417 107005 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
11048.03 21478.97 11245.37 20836.73 10430.78 19855.19 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1458 0.1496 0.1536 0.1520 0.1563 0.1562 
Notes: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the 
impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Male workers. Discontinuity effect at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
 .01042 
(.01352) 
-.00883 
(.00476) 
-.00024 
(.00793) 
-.00239 
(.00479) 
.01077 
(.01269) 
.00532 
(.00459) 
Dum
(2)
   .02918 
(.01976) 
-.00307 
(.01316)    
.00052 
(.01919)         
-.00303       
(.01260) 
-.00365 
(.01750)        
.00668 
(.01159)       
No. observations  28583 53899 27978   52724 27086 51396 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
6610.71 13098.40 6656.79 12248.60 5547.02 10567.76 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1812 0.1900 0.1955 0.1919 0.1885 0.1888 
Notes: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the 
impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Female workers. Discontinuity effect at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
 -.00925 
(.01389) 
-.00136 
(.00508) 
-.00665 
(.01375) 
.01457 
(.01321) 
-.01932 
(.01955) 
-.00362 
(.00484) 
Dum
(2)
   -.00170 
(.02049) 
-.00589 
(.01353) 
.02335 
(.02011 ) 
.00031 
(.00506) 
-.02845 
(.01264807) 
-.01020 
(.01295) 
No. observations  29214 55554 29535 55378 29331 55609 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
5040.66 9529.44 5505.22 10287.81 5987.72 11228.77 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1290 0.1282 0.1417 0.1417 0.1628 0.1602 
Notes: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the 
impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy 
variable. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey. 
